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Robert Boyle's experimental programme had as its end-product the 
generation of indisputable matters of fact. In this paper 1analyze the 
resources used to produce  these matters of fact, paying particular attention 
to linguistic practices. Experimental reports rich in circumstantial detail were 
designed to enable readers of the text to create a mental image of an 
experimental scene they did not directly witness. I call this 'virtual 
witnessing', and its importance was as a means of enlarging the witnessing 
public.  The notion of a 'public'  for experimental science is, 1argue, essential 
to our understanding of how facts are generated and validated. In these 
episodes, circumstantial reporting was a technique for creating a public and 
for constituting authentic knowledge. 
Pump and Circumstance: 
Robert Boyle's Literary Technology 
Steven Shapin 
The  production  of  knowledge  and  the  communication  of 
knowledge are usually regarded as distinct activities. In this paper I 
shall argue to the contrary: speech about natural reality is a means 
of  generating knowledge about reality, of  securing assent to that 
knowledge,  and of bounding domains of certain knowledge from 
areas  of  less  certain  standing.  I  shall  attempt  to  display  the 
conventional status of specific ways of speaking about nature and 
natural knowledge, and I shall examine the historical circumstances 
in which these ways of speaking were institutionalized. Although I 
shall be dealing with communication within a scientific community, 
there is a clear  connection between this study and the analysis of 
scientific popularization. The popularization of  science is  usually 
understood  as the  extension of  experience  from the few  to the 
many. I argue here that one of the major resources for generating 
and validating items of knowledge within the scientific community 
under study was this same extension of experience from the few to 
the many: the creation of a  scientific public.  The etymology of 
some of our key  terms  is  apposite:  if  a  community  is  a group 
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sharing a common life, communication is a means of making things 
common. 
The materials selected to address this issue come from episodes 
of unusual  interest  to the history,  philosophy  and  sociology of 
science. Robert Boyle's experiments in pneumatics in the late 1650s 
and early 1660s represent a revolutionary moment in the career of 
scientific knowledge. In his New Experiments Physico-Mechanical 
(1660) and related  texts of  the early Restoration,  Boyle not only 
produced new knowledge of the behaviour of air, he exhibited the 
proper experimental means by which legitimate knowledge was to 
be generated and evaluated. And he did so against the background 
of alternative programmes for the production  of  knowledge, the 
proponents of which subjected Boyle's  recommended  methods to 
explicit  criticism.  What  was  at  issue  in  the  controversies  over 
Boyle's air-pump experiments during the 1660s was the question of 
how claims were to be authenticated as knowledge. What was to 
count as knowledge, or 'science'? How was this to be distinguished 
from  other  epistemological  categories,  such  as  'belief'  and 
'opinion'?  What degree of certainty could be expected of various 
intellectual enterprises and items of knowledge? And how could the 
appropriate grades of assurance and certainty be secured?' 
These  were  all  practical  matters.  In  the  setting  of  early 
Restoration England there was no one solution to the problem of 
knowledge which commanded universal assent. The technology of 
producing  knowledge  had to be  built,  exemplified  and defended 
against attack. The categories of  knowledge and their generation 
that seem to us  self-evident and unproblematic were neither self- 
evident  nor  unproblematic  in  the  1660s.  The  foundations  of 
knowledge were not matters merely  for philosophers'  reflections; 
they had to be constructed and the propriety of their foundational 
status  had  to be  argued.  The  difficulties  that  many  historians 
evidently have in recognizing this work of construction arise from 
the very success of that work: to a very large extent we  live in the 
conventional  world  of  knowledge-production that Boyle and his 
colleagues  amongst  the  experimental  philosophers  laboured  to 
make safe, self-evident and solid. 
Robert  Boyle  sought to secure universal  assent  by  way  of the 
experimental matter of fact.  About such facts one could be highly 
certain; about other items of natural knowledge more circumspec- 
tion was indicated. Boyle was, therefore, an important actor in the 
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England. Before circa 1660, as Hacking and Shapiro have shown, 
the  designations  of  'knowledge'  and  'science'  were  rigidly 
distinguished from 'opinion'.2 Of the former one could expect the 
absolute  certainty  of  demonstration,  exemplified  by  logic  and 
geometry. The goal of physical  science had been to attain to this 
kind  of  certainty that compelled assent. By  contrast, the English 
experimentalists  of  the mid-seventeenth century increasingly took 
the view that all that could be expected of physical knowledge was 
probability,  thus breaking  down  the radical  distinction  between 
'knowledge'  and 'opinion'.  Physical hypotheses were provisional 
and  revisable;  assent  to  them  was  not  necessary,  as  it  was  to 
mathematical demonstration; and physical science was, to varying 
degrees,  removed  from  the  realm  of  the  dem~nstrative.~ The 
probabilistic conception of physical knowledge was not regarded as 
a regrettable retreat from more ambitious goals; it was celebrated 
by  its  proponents  as a  wise  rejection  of  failed  dogmatism. The 
quest for necessary and universal  assent to physical  propositions 
was seen as improper and impolitic. 
If  universal  assent  was  not  to  be  expected  of  explanatory 
constructs in science, how, then, was proper science to be founded? 
Boyle and the experimentalists offered the matter of fact. The fact 
was  the item  of  knowledge  about which  it  was  legitimate to be 
'morally  certain'.  A  crucial  boundary  was  drawn  around  the 
domain of the factual, separating it from those items which might 
be  otherwise and from which  absolute and permanent  certainty 
should  not  be  expected. Nature  was  like a clock:  man could  be 
certain of  its  effects, of  the hours  shown by  its  hands;  but the 
mechanism by which these effects were produced, the clock-work, 
might be various.' 
It is in the understanding of how matters of fact were produced 
and how they came to command universal  assent that historians 
have tended to succumb to the temptations of self-evidence.'  It is 
the purpose of this paper to display the processes by which Boyle 
constructed experimental matters of fact and thereby produced the 
conditions in which assent could be mobilized. 
The Mechanics of  Fact-Making 
Boyle  proposed  that  matters  of  fact  be  generated  by  a 
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an experimental performance, that was witnessed by one man alone 
was not a matter of fact. If that witness could be extended to many, 
and in principle to all men, then the result could be constituted as a 
matter  of  fact.  In this  way,  the matter  of  fact  was  at once an 
epistemological  and a social category. The foundational category 
of the experimental philosophy, and of what counted as properly 
grounded knowledge generally, was an artefact of communication 
and of whatever social forms were deemed necessary to sustain and 
enhance communication. I argue that the establishment of matters 
of fact utilized three technologies: a material technology embedded 
in  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  air-pump;  a  literary 
technology  by  means  of  which  the phenomena  produced  by  the 
pump were made known to those who were not direct witnesses; 
and a social technology which  laid down the conventions natural 
philosophers  should  employ  in  dealing  with  each  other  and 
considering knowledge- claim^.^ Given the concerns of this paper, I 
shall be devoting most attention to Boyle's literary technology: the 
expository means by  which  matters of  fact were established  and 
assent mobilized. Yet the impression should not be given that we 
are dealing  with  three  distinct  technologies:  each  embedded the 
others. For example, experimental practices employing the material 
technology of the air-pump crystallized particular forms of social 
organization; desired forms of social organization were dramatized 
in the exposition of experimental findings; the literary reporting of 
air-pump performances provided an experience that was said to be 
essential to the propagation of the material technology or even to 
be a valid substitute for direct witness. In studying Boyle's literary 
technology we are not, therefore, talking about something which is 
merely a 'report' of what was done elsewhere; we are dealing with a 
most important form of experience and the means for extending 
and validating experience. 
The Material Technology of the Air-Pump 
We  start  by  noting  the  obvious:  Boyle's  matters  of  fact  were 
machine-made.  In  his  terminology,  performances  using  the  air- 
pump  counted  as  'unobvious'  or  'elaborate'  experiments, 
contrasted  to either  the  'simple'  observation  of  nature  or  the 
'obvious'  experiments  involved  in  reflecting  upon  common 
artefacts  like  gardener's  The the  ~aterin~-~ot.~ air-pump  (or Shapin: Pump and Circumstance 
Figure  1 
Bo?le'5 Air Pump of 1660 
(Source: from Boyle 'New Experiments Physico-Mechanical',  op. cit. note 1) 486  Social Studies of  Science 
'pneumatic  engine')  constructed  for  Boyle  in  1659  (largely  by 
Robert Hooke) was indeed an elaborate bit of scientific machinery 
(see Figure I).' It consisted of a glass 'receiver' of about 30-quarts 
volume, connected to a brass  'cylinder'  ('3') within which plied a 
wooden  piston  or  'sucker'  ('4').  The  aim  was  to evacuate the 
receiver of atmospheric air and thus to achieve a working vacuum. 
This  was  done  by  manually  operating  a  pair  of  valves:  on  the 
downstroke, valve 'S' (the stop-cock) was opened and valve 'R' was 
inserted; the sucker was then moved down by means of a rack-and- 
pinion  device  ('5'  and  '7').  On the upstroke,  the stop-cock  was 
closed, the valve 'R' removed, and a quantity of air drawn into the 
cylinder  was  expelled.  This  operation was  repeated  many  times 
until the effort of  moving the sucker became too great, at which 
point a working vacuum was deemed to have been attained. Great 
care had to be taken to ensure that the pump was sealed against 
leakage, for example at the juncture of  receiver and cylinder and 
around the sides of  the sucker. Experimental apparatus could be 
placed  into  the  receiver  through  an aperture  at  the top of  the 
receiver  ('B-C'),  for instance a barometer  or simple Torricellian 
apparatus. The machine was then ready to produce matters of fact. 
Boyle used the pump to generate phenomena which he interpreted 
in terms of  'the spring of the air' (its elasticity) and the weight of 
the air (its pressure). 
Boyle's  air-pump was, as he said, an 'elaborate'  device; it was 
also  temperamental  (difficult  to  operate  properly)  and  very 
expensive: the air-pump was seventeenth-century 'Big Science'. To 
finance its construction on an individual basis it helped mightily to 
be a son of the Earl of Cork. Other natural philosophers, almost as 
well  supplied  with  cash, shied  away from the cost of  having one 
built, and a major justification for founding scientific societies in 
the  1660s  and  afterwards  was  the  collective  financing  of  the 
instruments upon which the experimental philosophy was deemed 
to  depend. Air-pumps  were  not  widely distributed in  the  1660s. 
They  were  scarce  commodities:  Boyle's  original  machine  was 
quickly presented  to the Royal Society of London; he had one or 
two  re-designed  instruments  built  for  him  by  1662,  operating 
mainly in Oxford; Christiaan Huygens had one made in The Hague 
in 1661; there was one at the Montmor Academy in Paris; there was 
probably one at Christ's College, Cambridge by the mid-1660s, and 
Henry Power may have possessed one in Halifax from 1661. So far 
as can be found out, these were all the air-pumps that existed in the 487  Shapin: Pump and Circumstance 
decade after their in~ention.~ 
Thus,  air-pump  technology  posed  a  problem  of  access.  If 
knowledge  was  to be  produced  using  this  technology,  then  the 
numbers  of  philosophers  who  could  produce  it  were  limited. 
Indeed, in Restoration England this restriction was one of the chief 
recommendations of 'elaborate' experimentation: knowledge could 
no longer legitimately be generated by  alchemical 'secretists'  and 
sectarian  'enthusiasts'  who  claimed  individual  and  unmediated 
inspiration from God. Experimental knowledge was to be tempered 
by collective labour and disciplined by artificial devices. The very 
intricacy  of  machines  like the air-pump allowed  philosophers,  it 
was said, to discern which cause, amongst the many possible, might 
be responsible for observed effects. This was something, in Boyle's 
view, that the gardener's pot could not do.''  However, access to the 
machine had to be opened up if  knowledge-claims  were not to be 
regarded as mere individual opinion and if the machine's matters of 
fact were not to be validated on the bare say-so of an individual's 
authority. How was this special sort of access to be achieved? 
Witnessing Science 
In Boyle's  programme the capacity of experiments to yield matters 
of  fact  depended  not  only  upon  their  actual  performance  but 
essentially upon the assurance of the relevant community that they 
had  been  so  performed.  He  therefore  made  an  important 
distinction between  actual experiments and what are now termed 
'thought experiments'."  If knowledge was to be empirically based, 
as Boyle and other English experimentalists insisted it should, then 
its experimental foundations had to be attested to by eye-witnesses. 
Many phenomena, and particularly those alleged by the alchemists, 
were difficult to  credit; in which cases Boyle averred 'that they that 
have seen them can much more reasonably believe them, than they 
that have not.'12 The problem with eye-witnessing as a criterion for 
assurance was one of discipline. How did one police the reports of 
witnesses so as to avoid radical individualism? Was one obliged to 
credit a report on the testimony of any witness whatever? 
Boyle insisted that witnessing was to be a collective enterprise. In 
natural philosophy, as in criminal law, the reliability of testimony 
depended crucially upon its multiplicity: Social Studies of Science 
For,  though  the testimony  of  a  single  witness  shall  not  suffice  to prove  the 
accused party guilty of murder; yet the testimony of two witnesses, though but of 
equal credit  . . . shall ordinarily suffice to prove  a  man guilty; because  it  is 
thought  reasonable  to  suppose,  that,  though  each  testimony  single  be  but 
probable, yet a concurrence of such probabilities, (which ought in reason to be 
attributed to the truth of what they jointly tend to prove) may well amount to a 
moral certainty, i.e. such a certainty, as may warrant the judge to proceed to the 
sentence of death against the indicted party." 
And Thomas Sprat, defending the reliability of the Royal Society's 
judgements in matters of fact, inquired 
whether, seeing in all Countreys, that are govern'd by Laws, they expect no more, 
than the consent of two, or three witnesses, in matters of life, and estate; they will 
not think, they are fairly dealt withall, in what concerns their Knowledg, if  they 
have the concurring Testimonies of threescore or an hundred.14 
The thrust of the legal analogy should not be missed. It was not just 
that  one  was  multiplying  authority  by  multiplying  witnesses 
(although this was part of the tactic); it was that right action could 
be  taken, and seen to be taken, on the basis  of  these  collective 
testimonies. The action concerned the positive giving of assent to 
matters of  fact. The multiplication  of  witness  was  an indication 
that testimony referred to a true state of affairs in nature. Multiple 
witnessing  was  counted as an active, and not just  a descriptive, 
licence.  Does  it  not force the conclusion that such and such an 
action  was  done  (a  specific  trial),  and that  subsequent  action 
(offering assent) was warranted? 
In experimental practice one way of securing the multiplication 
of  witnesses  was  to perform  experiments in a social space.  The 
'laboratory'  was contrasted to the alchemist's  closet  precisely  in 
that the former was  said to be a public and the latter  a private 
space. The early air-pump trials were routinely performed  in the 
Royal Society's ordinary public rooms, the machine being brought 
there  specially  for  the  occasion.I5  In  reporting  upon  his 
experimental  performances  Boyle  commonly  specified  that they 
were 'many of them tried in the presence of ingenious men', or that 
he made them 'in the presence of an illustrious assembly of virtuosi 
(who were  spectators of the e~periment)."~  Boyle's  collaborator 
Robert Hooke worked to codify the Society's  procedures for the 
standard recording of experiments: the register was 'to be sign'd by 
a certain Number of the Persons present, who have been present, 
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their Names,  will  prove undoubted Testimony . . .'I7  And Sprat 
described the role of the 'Assembly'  in 'resolv[ing] upon the matter 
of  Fact'  by  collectively  correcting  individual  idiosyncracies  of 
observation and judgement.''  In reporting experiments that were 
particularly crucial or problematic, Boyle named his witnesses and 
stipulated their qualifications. Thus, the experiment of the original 
air-pump trials that was 'the principal fruit I promised myself from 
our engine'  was conducted in the presence of 'those excellent and 
deservedly famous Mathematic Professors,  Dr  Wallis,  Dr  Ward, 
and Mr  Wren  . . ., whom I name,  both as justly  counting it an 
honour to be known to them, and as being glad of such judicious 
and illustrious witnesses of our experiment . . .'Another important 
experiment was attested to by Wallis 'who will be allowed to be a 
very competent judge  in these matters.' And in his censure of the 
alchemists  Boyle  generally  warned  natural  philosophers  not  'to 
believe  chymical  experiments  . . . unless  he,  that  delivers  that, 
mentions his doing it upon his own particular knowledge, or upon 
the relation  of  some credible  person,  avowing  it  upon  his  own 
experience.'  Alchemists were recommended  to name the putative 
author of these experiments 'upon whose credit they relate' them.19 
The  credibility  of  witnesses  followed  the  taken-for-granted 
conventions of that setting for assessing individuals' reliability and 
trustworthiness:  Oxford professors were accounted more reliable 
witnesses than Oxfordshire peasants. The natural philosopher had 
no option but to rely for a substantial part of his knowledge on the 
testimony of witnesses; and, in assessing that testimony, he (no less 
than  judge  or  jury)  had  to  determine  their  credibility.  This 
necessarily  involved  their  moral  constitution  as  well  as  their 
knowledgeableness, 'for the two grand requisites, of a witness [are] 
the knowledge he has of the things he delivers, and his faithfulness 
in truly delivering what he knows.'  Thus, the giving of witness in 
experimental philosophy transitted the social and moral accounting 
systems of Restoration ~n~land.~' 
Another  important  way  of  multiplying  witnesses  to 
experimentally  produced  phenomena  was  to  facilitate  their 
replication.  Experimental  protocols  could be  reported  in  such  a 
way as to enable readers of the reports to perform the experiments 
for themselves,  thus ensuring distant  but direct  witnesses.  Boyle 
elected to publish several of his experimental series in the form of 
letters to other experimentalists or potential experimentalists. The 
New Experiments of 1660was written as a letter to his nephew Lord 490  Social Studies of Science 
Dungarvan; the various tracts of the Certain Physiological Essays 
of 1661 were written to another nephew Richard Jones; the History 
of Colours of  1664 was originally written to an unspecified  friend. 
The  purpose  of  this  form  of  communication  was  explicitly  to 
proselytize.  The  New  Experiments  was  published  so  'that  the 
person  I  addressed them to might, without mistake, and with  as 
little trouble as possible, be able to repeat such unusual experiments 
. . .'. The History  of  Colours was designed  'not  barely  to relate 
[the experiments], but . . . to teach a young gentleman  to make 
them.'*'  Boyle wished  to encourage young gentlemen to 'addict' 
themselves to experimental pursuits and, thereby, to multiply both 
experimental philosophers and experimental facts. 
Replication,  however,  rarely  succeeded,  as  Boyle  himself 
recognized. When  he  came to prepare  the Continuation  of New 
Experiments seven years after the original  air-pump trials, Boyle 
admitted  that, despite  his  care  in  communicating details  of  the 
engine  and  of  his  procedures,  there  had  been  few  successful 
replications: 
. . . in five or six years I could hear but of one or two engines that were brought 
to be fit to work, and of but one or two new experiments that had been added by 
the ingenious owners of them . . .*' 
This situation had not notably changed by the mid-1670s.  In the 
seven  or eight  years  after the Continuation, Boyle  said  that  he 
heard 'of very few experiments made, either in the engine I used, or 
in any other made after the model thereof.' By  this time a note of 
despair  began  to  appear  in  Boyle's  statements  concerning  the 
replication of his air-pump experiments. He 
was  more willing  to set  down divers  things  with  their  minute circumstances; 
because  1 was  of  opinion, that probably many of  these experiments would be 
never either re-examined by others, or re-iterated by myself. For though they may 
be easily read . . . yet he, that shall really go about to repeat them, will find it no 
easy task.23 
The Literary Technology of Virtual Witnessing 
The third way by which witnesses could be multiplied is far more 
important  than  the  performance  of  experiments  before  direct 
witnesses or the facilitating of actual replication: it is what I shall Shapin: Pump and Circumstance  491 
call  'virtual  witnessing'.  The  technology  of  virtual  witnessing 
involves the production in a reader's mind of such an image of an 
experimental scene  as obviates the  necessity  for either  its  direct 
witness  or  its  replication.  Through  virtual  witnessing  the 
multiplication of witnesses could be in principle unlimited. It was 
therefore the most powerful technology for constituting matters of 
fact. The  validation  of  experiments,  and  the  crediting  of  their 
outcomes as matters of fact, necessarily entailed their realization in 
the laboratory of the mind and the mind's eye. What was required 
was a technology  of trust and assurance that the things had been 
done and done in the way claimed. 
The technology of virtual witnessing was not different in kind to 
that used to facilitate actual replication. One could deploy the same 
linguistic resources in order to encourage the physical replication of 
experiments or to trigger in the reader's mind a naturalistic image 
of the experimental scene. Of course, actual replication was to be 
preferred,  for this eliminated  reliance  upon testimony altogether. 
Yet,  because  of natural  and  legitimate  suspicion  amongst  those 
who were neither direct witnesses nor replicators, a greater degree 
of  assurance was  required  to produce assent in virtual witnesses. 
Boyle's  literary technology was crafted to secure this assent. 
Prolixity and Iconography 
In order to understand how Boyle deployed his literary technology 
of virtual witnessing we have to reorientate some of  our common 
ideas about the status of the scientific text.  We usually think of an 
experimental report as a narration of some prior visual experience: 
it  points  to sensory experience that  lies  behind  the text. This  is 
correct.  However,  we  should  also  appreciate that  the text  itself 
constitutes a visual  source. It  is my task here to see how Boyle's 
texts were constructed so as to provide a source of virtual witness 
that  was  agreed to be  reliable.  The best  way  to fasten upon the 
notion of the text as this kind of source might be to start by looking 
at some of the pictures that Boyle provided alongside his prose. 
Figure 1, for example, is an engraving of his original air-pump, 
appended  to  the  New  Experiments.  Producing  these  kinds  of 
images was an expensive  business  in the mid-seventeenth century 
and natural philosophers used them sparingly. As we  see, Figure 1 
is  not  a  schematized  line-drawing  but  an -attempt  at  detailed Social Studies of Science 
naturalistic  representation,  complete  with  the  conventions  of 
shadowing and cut-away sections of parts. This is not a picture of 
the 'idea'  of an air-pump but of a particular existing air-pump.24 
The  same  applies  to  Boyle's  pictorial  representations  of  his 
particular pneumatic experiments: in one, we  are shown a mouse 
lying dead in the receiver; in another, images of the experimenters. 
Boyle  devoted  great  attention  to  the  manufacture  of  these 
engravings, sometimes consulting directly with artist and engraver, 
sometimes by way of ~ooke.~'  Their role was to be a supplement to 
the imaginative witness provided  by the words in the text.  In the 
Continuation Boyle expanded upon the relationships between the 
two sorts of  exposition. He told his readers that 'they who either 
were versed in such kind of studies or have any peculiar facility of 
imagining,  would  well  enough  conceive  my  meaning  only  by 
words,' but others required visual assistance. He apologized for the 
relative  poverty  of  the  images,  'being  myself  absent  from  the 
engraver for a good part of the time he was at work, some of the 
cuts were misplaced, and not graven in the plates.'26 
Thus,  visual  representations,  few  as they  necessarily  were  in 
Boyle's  texts,  were  mimetic  devices.  By  virtue  of  the density of 
circumstantial detail that could be conveyed through the engraver's 
laying of lines, the images imitated reality and gave the viewer a 
vivid impression of the experimental scene. The sort of naturalistic 
images  that  Boyle  favoured  provided  a  greater  density  of 
circumstantial  detail  than  would  have  been  proffered  by  more 
schematic  representations.  The images  served  to announce that 
'this was really done'  and that it was done in the way stipulated; 
they allayed distrust and facilitated virtual witnessing. Therefore, 
understanding the role of pictorial representations offers a way of 
appreciating  what  Boyle  was  trying to achieve  with  his  literary 
technology.27 
In the introductory pages of the New Experiments, Boyle's  first 
published  experimental  findings,  he  directly  announced  his 
intention to be 'somewhat prolix'. His excuses were three-fold: first 
delivering things 'circumstantially' would, as we have already seen, 
facilitate replication; second, the density of circumstantial  details 
was justified  by the fact that these were  'new'  experiments, with 
novel conclusions drawn from them: it was therefore necessary that 
they  be  'circumstantially  related,  to  keep  the  reader  from 
distrusting  them';  third,  circumstantial  reports  such  as  these 
offered the possibility of virtual witnessing. As Boyle said, 'these 493  Shapin: Pump and Circumstance 
narratives [are to be] as standing records in our new pneumatics, 
and [readers] need not reiterate themselves an experiment to have 
as  distinct  an  idea  of  it,  as  may  suffice  them  to ground  their 
reflexions and speculations upon'.28 If  one wrote an experimental 
report in the correct way, the reader could take on trust that these 
things happened. Further, it would be as if  that reader had been 
present at the proceedings. He would be recruited as a witness and 
be  put  in  a  position  where  he  could  validate  experimental 
phenomena as matters of fact.29  Therefore, attention to the writing 
of  experimental  reports  was  of  equal  importance  to  doing  the 
experiments themselves. 
In the late 1650s Boyle devoted himself to laying down the rules 
for  the  literary  technology  of  the  experimental  programme. 
Stipulations  about  how  to  write  proper  scientific  prose  are 
dispersed throughout his experimental reports of the 1660s, but he 
also  composed  a  special  tract  on  the  subject  of  'experimental 
essays'. Here Boyle offered extended apologia for his 'prolixity': 'I 
have,'  he understated, 'declined that succinct way of  writing';  he 
had sometimes 'delivered things, to make them more clear, in such 
a multitude of  words, that I now seem even to myself  to have in 
divers places been guilty of verbosity . . .' Not just  his  'verbosity' 
but also Boyle's  ornate sentence-structure, with appositive clauses 
piled on top of each other, was, he said, part of a plan to convey 
circumstantial details and to give the impression of verisimilitude: 
. . . I  have  knowingly and  purposely transgressed the laws  of  oratory in  one 
particular, namely, in making sometimes my periods [i.e., complete sentences] or 
parentheses  over-long:  for when  I  could  not within  the compass of  a regular 
period comprise what I thought requisite to be delivered at once, I chose rather to 
neglect the precepts of  rhetoricians,  than the mention of those things, which  1 
thought pertinent to my subject, and useful to you, my reader.30 
Elaborate  sentences,  with  circumstantial  details  encompassed 
within the confines of  one grammatical entity, might mimic that 
immediacy  and  simultaneity of  experience  afforded by  pictorial 
representations. 
Boyle  was  endeavouring  to  constitute  himself  as  a  reliable 
purveyor  of  experimental testimony and to offer conventions by 
means  of  which  others  could  do  likewise.  The  provision  of 
circumstantial details of experimental scenes was a way of assuring 
readers that real experiments had yielded the findings stipulated. It 
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accounts  of  failed  experiments.  This  performed  two  functions: 
first, it allayed anxieties in those neophyte experimentalists whose 
expectations of success were not immediately fulfilled; second, it 
assured  the reader  that the relator  was  not  wilfully  suppressing 
inconvenient evidence, that he was in fact being faithful to reality. 
Complex  and  circumstantial  accounts  were  to  be  taken  as 
undistorted  mirrors  of  complex  experimental  performances,  in 
which a wide range of contingencies might influence out~ornes.~' 
So, for example, it  was  not legitimate to hide the fact  that  air- 
pumps sometimes did not work properly or that they often leaked: 
'. . . I  think  it  becomes  one, that  professeth  himself  a  faithful 
relator  of  experiments  not  to  conceal'  such  unfortunate 
contingencies.32 It  is,  however,  vital  to keep  in  mind  that  the 
contingencies  proffered  in  Boyle's  circumstantial  accounts 
represent a selection of possible contingencies. There was not, nor 
can  there  be,  any  such  thing  as  a  report  which  notes  all 
circumstances which  might  affect an experiment.  Circumstantial, 
or stylized, accounts do not, therefore, exist as pure forms but as 
publicly acknowledged moves towards or away from the reporting 
of contingencies. 
The Modesty of Experimental Narrative 
The ability  of  the reporter  to multiply  witnesses depended upon 
readers'  acceptance of him as a provider  of reliable testimony. It 
was the burden of Boyle's literary technology to assure his readers 
that he was such a man as should be believed. He therefore had to 
find the means to make visible in the text the accepted tokens of a 
man  of  good  faith. One technique has just  been  discussed:  the 
reporting  of  experimental  failures.  A  man  who  recounted 
unsuccessful experiments was such a man whose objectivity was not 
distorted by his interests. Thus, the literary display of a certain sort 
of  morality was a technique in the making of  matters of  fact. A 
man whose narratives could be credited as mirrors of reality was a 
'modest  man'; his reports should make that modesty visible. 
Boyle found a number of ways of displaying modesty. One of the 
most straightforward was the use of the form of the experimental 
essay. The essay, (that is, the piece-meal reporting of experimental 
trials)  was  explicitly  contrasted  to  the  natural  philosophical 
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'confident' individuals, whose ambition extended beyond what was 
proper  or  possible.  By  contrast,  those  who  wrote  experimental 
essays  were  'sober  and  modest  men',  'diligent  and  judicious' 
philosophers, who did not 'assert more than they can prove.' This 
practice  cast  the  experimental  philosopher  into  the  role  of 
intellectual  'under-builder',  or even  that of  'a drudge of  greater 
industry than reason'. This was, however, a noble character, for it 
was one that was freely chosen to further 'the real advancement of 
true  natural  philosophy'  rather  than personal  re~utation.~~  The 
public display of this modesty was an exhibition that concern for 
individual  celebrity  did  not  cloud  judgement  and  distort  the 
integrity of one's reports. In this connection it is absolutely crucial 
to remember  who  it  was  that was  portraying  himself  as a mere 
'under-builder'. He was the son of the Earl of Cork, and everyone 
knew that very well. Thus, it was plausible that such modesty could 
have a noble character, and Boyle's  presentation of  self as a role 
model for experimental philosophers was powerful.34 
Another  technique  for  displaying  modesty  was  Boyle's 
professedly  'naked  way  of  writing'.  He would  eschew a  'florid' 
style;  his  object  was  to write  'rather  in  a  philosophical  than a 
rhetorical  strain'.  This  plain,  puritanical,  unadorned  (yet 
convoluted) style was identified as functional.  It served to exhibit, 
once  more,  the  philosopher's  dedication  to  community  service 
rather than to his personal reputation. Moreover, the 'florid' style 
to be  avoided was  a hindrance to the clear  provision  of  virtual 
witness:  it  was,  Boyle  said,  like  painting  'the  eye-glasses of  a 
telescope' .35 
The  most  important  literary  device  Boyle  employed  for 
demonstrating  modesty  acted  to  protect  the  fundamental 
epistemological  category  of  the  experimental  programme:  the 
matter of  fact. There were to be appropriate moral postures, and 
appropriate modes of speech, for epistemological items on either 
side of the crucial boundary that separated matters of fact from the 
locutions  used  to  account  for  them:  theories,  hypotheses, 
speculations, and the like. Thus, Boyle told his nephew, 
in almost every one of the following essays 1 . . . speak so doubtingly, and use so 
often, perhaps,  if seems,  ~t is not improbable, and such other  expressions,  as 
argue a diffidence of the truth of the opinions I incline to, and that I should be so 
shy  of  laying  down  principles,  and  sometimes  of  so  much  as  venturing  at 
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Since knowledge of physical causes was only 'probable',  this was 
the correct moral stance and manner of  speech, but things were 
otherwise with matters of fact, and here a confident mode was not 
only permissible but necessary: 
. . . I dare speak confidently and positively of very few things, except of matters 
of fact.16 
It was necessary to speak confidently of matters of fact because, 
as the foundations of proper philosophy, they required protection. 
And it was proper to speak confidently of matters of fact, because 
they were not of  one's own making; they were, in the empiricist 
model, discovered  rather than invented. As Boyle told one of his 
adversaries, experimental facts can 'make their own way' and 'such 
as  were  very  probable,  would  meet  with  patrons  and defenders 
. . .'37  The separation of modes of speech, and the ability of facts 
to make their own way, was made visible on the printed page. In 
New Experiments Boyle said he intended to leave 'a conspicuous 
interval'  between  his  narratives  of experimental findings and his 
occasional 'discourses'  upon their interpretation. One might then 
read the experiments and the 'reflexions'  separately.38  Indeed, the 
construction  of  Boyle's  experimental  essays  makes  manifest  the 
proper  balance  between  the  two  categories:  New  Experiments 
consists  of  a  sequential  narrative of  43  pneumatic  experiments; 
Continuation of  50;  and the second part  of  Continuation  of  an 
even  larger  number  of  disconnected  experimental  observations, 
only sparingly larded with interpretative locutions. 
The confidence with which one ought to speak about matters of 
fact extended to stipulations about the proper use of authorities. 
Citations of other writers should be employed to use them not as 
'judges, but as witnesses',  as 'certificates to attest matters of fact.' 
If  this  practice  ran  the  risk  of  identifying  the  experimental 
philosopher  as an ill-read  philistine,  it  was,  however,  necessary: 
'. . .  I could  be  very  well  content to be  thought  to have  scarce 
looked upon any other book than that of nat~re.'~'  The injunction 
against citing of authorities performed a significant function in the 
mobilization of assent to matters of fact. It was a way of displaying 
that one was aware of the workings of the Baconian 'Idols' and was 
taking measures to mitigate their corrupting effects on knowledge- 
claims.40  A disengagement between experimental narrative and the 
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preconceived  expectations  and,  especially,  of  theoretical 
investments in  the outcome of experiments. For  example, Boyle 
several  times  insisted  that  he  was  an  innocent  of  the  great 
theoretical systems of the seventeenth century. In order to reinforce 
the primacy of  experimental findings,  'I had purposely  refrained 
from acquainting myself thoroughly with the intire system of either 
the  Atomical,  or  the  Cartesian,  or  any  other  whether  new  or 
received  philosophy  . . .' And,  again,  he  claimed  that  he  had 
avoided a systematic acquaintance with the systems of Gassendi, 
Descartes, and even of Bacon, 'that I might not be prepossessed 
with any theory or principles . . .'41 
Boyle's  'naked way of writing',  his professions and displays of 
humility,  and  his  exhibition  of  theoretical  innocence  all 
complemented  each other in the establishment and the protection 
of  matters  of  fact.  They  served  to  portray  the  author  as  a 
disinterested  observer  and  his  accounts  as  unclouded  and 
undistorted mirrors of nature. Such an author gave the signs of a 
man  whose  testimony  was  reliable.  Hence,  his  texts  could  be 
credited and the number of witnesses to his experimental narratives 
could be multiplied indefinitely. 
Scientific Discourse and the Community 
I  have  said  that  the  matter  of  fact  was  a  social  as  well  as  an 
intellectual category.  And I  have argued that Boyle deployed his 
literary  technology  so as  to make virtual  witnessing  a  practical 
option for the validation of experimental performances. I want in 
this  section  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  Boyle's  literary 
technology dramatized the social relations proper to a community 
of  experimental philosophers.  Only by establishing  right  rules  of 
discourse between  individuals could matters of fact be generated 
and defended, and only by constituting these matters of fact into 
the agreed foundations of knowledge could a moral community of 
experimentalists be created and sustained. Matters of fact were to 
be  produced  in  a  public  space:  a  particular  space  in  which 
experiments were collectively performed and directly witnessed and 
an  abstract  space  constituted  through  virtual  witnessing.  The 
problem of producing this kind of knowledge was, therefore, the 
problem of maintaining a certain form of discourse and a certain 
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ways  in which  Boyle's  literary  technology  worked  to create and 
maintain this social solidarity amongst experimental philosophers. 
The Linguistic  Boundaries  of  the Experimental 
Community 
In the late 1650s and early 1660s, when Boyle was formulating his 
experimental  and  literary  practices,  the  English  experimental 
community was still in its infancy. Even with the founding of the 
Royal Society,  the crystallization of an experimental  community 
centred on Gresham College, and the network  of correspondence 
organized by Henry Oldenburg, the experimental programme was 
far from securely institutionalized. Criticisms of the experimental 
way  of  producing  physical  knowledge  emanated  from  English 
philosophers  (notably  Hobbes)  and  from  Continental  writers 
committed to rationalist methods and to the practice of physics as a 
demonstrative discipline. Experimentalists  were made into figures 
of fun on the Restoration stage: Thomas Shadwell's The Virtuoso 
dramatized the absurdity of weighing the air, and scored most of its 
good jokes  by parodying the convoluted language of Sir Nicholas 
Gimcrack  (~o~le).~~  of The  practice  experimental  philosophy, 
despite  what  numerous  historians  have  assumed,  was  not 
overwhelmingly  popular  in  Restoration  ~n~land.~~  In  order  for 
experimental philosophy to be established as a legitimate activity, 
several  things  needed  to  be  done.  First,  it  required  recruits: 
experimentalists had to be enlisted as neophytes, and converts from 
other forms of philosophical practice had to be obtained. Second, 
the social role of  the experimental philosopher  and the linguistic 
practices appropriate to an experimental community needed to be 
defined and publicized.44  What was the proper nature of discourse 
in such a community? What were the linguistic signs of competent 
membership?  And  what  uses  of  language  could  be  taken  as 
indications that an individual had transgressed the conventions of 
the community? 
The entry  fee  to the  experimental  community  was  to be  the 
communication of  a candidate matter of  fact.  In  The Sceptical 
Chymist, for instance, Boyle extended an olive-branch even to the 
alchemists.  The solid  experimental  findings  produced  by  some 
alchemists  could  be  sifted  from  the  dross  of  their  'obscure' 
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Aristotelians) frequently  'do not evince what  they are alleged to 
prove',  the  former  could  be  accepted  into  the  experimental 
philosophy by stripping away the theoretical language with which 
they happened to be glossed. As Carneades (Boyle's  mouthpiece) 
said, 
. . . your hermetic philosophers present  us, together with divers substantial and 
noble experiments, theories,  which either  like peacocks  feathers make a great 
shew, but  are neither  solid  nor  useful;  or else  like  apes,  if  they  have  some 
appearance of being rational, are blemished with some absurdity or other, that, 
when they are attentively considered, make them appear ridiculou~.~~ 
Thus,  those  alchemists  who  wished  to be  incorporated  into  a 
legitimate philosophical community were instructed what linguistic 
practices  could secure their entry. The same principles  were laid 
down with respect to any practitioner: 'let his opinions be never so 
false, his experiments being  true, I  am not obliged  to believe the 
former, and am left at liberty to benefit myself by the latter.'46  By 
arguing  that  there  was  only  a  contingent,  not  a  necessary, 
connection between the language of matters of fact and theoretical 
language,  Boyle  was  defining  the  linguistic  terms  upon  which 
existing communities could join the experimental enterprise. They 
were  liberal  terms,  which  might  serve  to  maximize  potential 
member~hi~.~' 
There were other natural philosophers Boyle despaired to recruit. 
Hobbes, notably, was the kind of philosopher who, on no account, 
ought to be admitted, for he denied the value of  systematic and 
elaborate experimentation, the foundational status of the matter of 
fact, and the distinction between  causal and descriptive language. 
Of  Hobbes's  Dialogus  physicus,  Boyle  asked  'What  new 
experiment  or matter  of  fact  Mr Hobbes  has  therein  added  to 
enrich  the  history  of  nature  . . .?'  In  his  criticisms  of  Boyle's 
experiments Hobbes 'does not, that I remember, deny the truth of 
any of the matters of  fact I have delivered.'  According to Boyle, 
both Hobbes and another critic, the Jesuit Franciscus Linus, had 
not  'seen  cause to deny any thing that I deliver as e~periment.'~' 
One  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  competent  member  of  the 
experimental  community  if  one  failed  to  communicate 
experimental matters of  fact, or if one did  so in  a manner that 
failed to recognize the lingilistic boundaries between  factual and 
causal locutions. 500  Social Studies of Science 
Linguistic  Boundaries  within  the  Experimental 
Community 
Just  as  linguistic  categories  were  used  to manage  entry  to the 
experimental  community,  distinctions  between  the  language  of 
facts and  that  of  theories  were  deployed  to regulate  discourse 
within it. In broad terms, Boyle insisted upon a separation between 
'physiological'  and  'metaphysical'  languages:  experimental 
discourse was  to be  confined to the former. One of the central 
categories of Boyle's  'new pneumatics' also happened to be a major 
preoccupation  of  the  old  physics - namely,  vacuism  versus 
plenism,  and  the judgement  whether  a vacuum  was  possible  in 
nature. How was it proper to speak of the contents of the receiver 
of  an evacuated  air-pump?  And  how  did  this  speech  relate  to 
traditional usages of the term 'vacuum'? 
A practical problem was posed by the fact that the lexicon of the 
new  philosophy  was  largely  compiled  out of  the  usages  of  old 
discursive  practices.  Old  words  had  to be  given  new  meanings. 
Thus, it was proper to apply the term 'vacuum' to the contents of 
the exhausted receiver, but it was improper to take this to mean 
that  the  space  was  absolutely  devoid  of  all  matter.  Such  an 
absolutely void space was the 'vacuum'  of metaphysical discourse. 
What Boyle meant by the air-pump's 'vacuum'  was 'not a space, 
wherein there is no body at all, but such as is either altogether, or 
almost totally devoid of air.'49  If contemporary plenists maintained 
that this vacuum  might  be  filled by  a subtle form of  matter, or 
'aether',  Boyle  could  reply  with  a  series  of  experiments  which 
showed that such an aether could not be made 'sensible',  that is, it 
had no physical manifestations.  And speech of entities that were 
not  amenable  to  sensible  experimentation  was  not  permissible 
within experimental philosophy.50 
The separation of 'physiological'  from 'metaphysical'  language 
was most crucial to Boyle's strategy for dealing with causal inquiry 
in physical  science.  In keeping with his probabilist  conception of 
knowledge, Boyle wished  to bracket off speech about matters of 
fact, about  which  one  might  be  certain,  from  speech  of  their 
physical  causes, which were at best probable. In terms of Boyle's 
air-pump  programme,  the  most  important  instance  of  this 
bracketing  concerned the notion which  was the main product  of 
these  experiments:  the  'spring  of  the  air'.  Boyle  said  that  his 
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air, but only to manifest, that the air hath a spring, and to relate 
some  of  its  effects.'  The cause  of  the  air's  elasticity  might  be 
accounted  for  variously:  by  Cartesian  vortices,  or  by  the  real 
physical existence in the corpuscles of the air of 'slender springs' or 
of a fleecy str~cture.~'  The job of the experimental philosopher was 
to  speak  of  experimentally-produced  matters  of  fact,  not  to 
conjecture further than that.52 
Boyle had considerable problems in diffusing this new mode of 
speech. Plenist critics persisted  in understanding Boyle to be using 
'vacuum'  in  its  metaphysical  sense,  and  Boyle  was  obliged 
persistently  to  reiterate  its  proper  usage.53 Other  writers  either 
refused  to conceive  of  a  natural  philosophy  that  bracketed  off 
causal speech, or reckoned that Boyle must be committed to some 
(illegitimate and unacknowledged) causal account of the spring of 
the air.54  So far as the 'spring of the air' was concerned, Boyle's 
stipulation that it had been made experimentally 'manifest' and his 
disinclination to speak  of  its cause had an interesting effect. By 
putting the spring on the other side of  the boundary from causal 
locutions, Boyle constituted the spring, for all practical purposes, 
into a matter of fact. When it came to labelling the epistemological 
status of the spring, Boyle variously referred to it as an 'hypothesis' 
or  even  as  a  'doctrine'.  However,  by  making  the  spring  into 
something that was  made  manifest  through experiment,  and  by 
protecting it  from the uncertainties  that afflicted  epistemological 
items  like  causal  notions,  Boyle  treated  this  'hypothesis'  in  the 
same way that he treated other matters of  fact.55 
The  vital  difference  between  matters  of  fact  and  all  other 
epistemological  categories  was  the  degree  of  assent  one  might 
expect  to them. To an authenticated  matter of  fact  all men  will 
assent. In Boyle's system that was taken for granted because it was 
through the technologies  that multiplied  witness  that matters of 
fact were constituted. General assent was what  made matters of 
fact, and general assent was therefore mobilized around matters of 
fact. With 'hypotheses',  'theories',  'conjectures',  and the like, the 
situation  was  quite  different.  These  categories  threatened  that 
assent which could be crystallized in the institution of the matter of 
fact.  Thus,  the  linguistic  conventions  of  Boyle's  experimental 
programme separated speech appropriate to the two categories as a 
way of drawing the boundaries between that about which one was 
to expect  certainty  and  assent  and that  about  which  one could 
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dissent or to oblige men to agree to all items in natural philosophy 
(as it was for Hobbes); rather, it was to manage dissent and to keep 
it within safe bounds. An authenticated matter of fact was treated 
as a mirror of nature; a theory, by contrast, was clearly man-made 
and could, therefore, be  contested.  Boyle's  linguistic  boundaries 
acted to segregate what could be  disputed from what could not. 
The management of dispute in experimental philosophy was crucial 
to protecting the foundations of knowledge. 
Manners in Dispute 
Since natural philosophers were not to be compelled to give assent 
to  all  items  of  knowledge,  dispute  and  controversy  was  to be 
expected.  How  should  this  be  dealt  with?  The  problem  of 
conducting  dispute was  a matter of  intense  practical  concern  in 
early Restoration science. During the Civil War and Interregnum 
the  divisiveness  of  'enthusiasts',  sectarians  and  hermeticists 
threatened to bring about radical individualism in philosophy. Nor 
did the various sects of Peripatetic natural philosophers display a 
public image of a stable and united intellectual community. Unless 
the  new  experimental community  could  exhibit  a broadly-based 
consensus and harmony within its own ranks, it was unreasonable 
to expect it to secure the legitimacy within Restoration culture that 
its leaders desired. Moreover, that very consensus was vital to the 
establishment of matters of fact as the foundational category of the 
new practice. 
By  the  early  1660s Boyle  was  in  a  position  to give  concrete 
exemplars of  how  disputes ought  to be  conducted;  three  critics 
published their responses to his New Experiments, and he replied to 
each one: Linus, Hobbes and Henry More. But even before he had 
been  engaged in dispute, Boyle laid down a set of  rules for how 
controversies were to be handled by the experimental philosopher. 
For example, in A Proemial Essay (composed 1657), Boyle insisted 
that disputes should be about findings and not about persons. It 
was proper to take a hard view of reports which were inaccurate but 
most improper to attack the character of those who rendered them: 
'for I love to speak of persons with civility, though of things with 
freedom'. The ad  hominem style must at all costs be avoided, for 
the risk was that of making foes out of mere dissenters. This was 
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wrong  they  may be,  must  be  treated  as possible  converts to the 
experimental philosophy.  If, however,  they  were bitterly treated, 
they would be lost to the cause and to the community whose size 
and consensus validated  matters of  fact: 
And as for the (very much too common) practice of many, who write, as if they 
thought railing at a man's person. or wrangling about his words, necessary to the 
confutation of his opinions; besides that I think such a quarrelsome and injurious 
way of writing does \cry much misbecome both a philosopher and a Christian. 
methinks it is as unwise, as it is provoking. For if  I civilly endeavour to reason a 
man out of his opinion\, I make myself but one work to do, namely, to convince 
his understanding; but, if  in a bitter or exasperating way  I  oppose his errors, I 
increase the difficulties I would surmount, and have as well his affections against 
me as his judgment: and it is very uneasy to make a proselyte of him, that is not 
only a dissenter from us, but an enemy to us." 
Furthermore,  it  was  impolitic  to acknowledge  the  existence  of 
'sects' in natural philosophy. One way by which one could hope to 
overcome  sectarianism was  to decline  public  recognition  that it 
existed:  'it  is  none of  my  design,'  Boyle said,  'to engage myself 
with, or against, any one sect of Naturalists . . .' The experiments 
will decide the case. The views of these 'sects'  should be noted only 
insofar as they  are founded upon experiment. Therefore, it was 
right and politic to be harsh in one's writings against those who do 
not  contribute experimental  findings,  for  they  have  nothing  to 
offer  to  the  constitution  of  matters  of  fact.  Finally,  the 
experimental  philosopher  must  show  that  there  was  point  and 
purpose to legitimately conducted dispute. He should be prepared 
publicly to renounce positions  that were shown to be erroneous. 
Flexibility  followed from fallibilism. As Boyle wrote, 'till a man is 
sure he is infallible, it is not fit for him to be unalterable."' 
The conventions for managing dispute were dramatized in the 
structure of  The Sceptical Chymist. These fictional conversations 
(between  an  Aristotelian,  two  varieties  of  hermeticists,  and 
'Carneades'  as mouth-piece for Boyle) took the form, not of  a 
Socratic dialogue, but of a conferen~e.~' They were a little piece of 
theatre that exhibited  how  persuasion, dissensus  and, ultimately, 
conversion to truth ought to be  conducted. Several points  about 
Boyle's  theatre  of  persuasion  can  be  briefly  made:  first,  the 
'symposiasts' are imaginary, not real. This means that opinions can 
be  confuted  without  exacerbating  relations  between  real 
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man',  is not Boyle himself: Carneades is made actually to quote 
'our  friend Mr Boyle'  as a device  for distancing  opinions  from 
individuals. The author is  insulated  from the text  and from the 
opinions he may actually espouse. Second, truth is not inculcated 
from Carneades to his  interlocutors;  rather  it  is  dramatized  as 
emerging through the con~ersation.~~  Everyone is  seen to have a 
say  in  the  consensus  which  is  the  den~uement.~'  Third,  the 
conversation is, without exception, civil: as Boyle said, 'I am not 
sorry  to  have  this  opportunity  of  giving  an  example,  how  to 
manage  even  disputes with  civility . . .'61 No  symposiast  abuses 
another; no ill temper is displayed; no one leaves the conversation 
in  pique  fr~stration.~~  and  importantly, or  Fourth,  most  the 
currency  of  intellectual  discourse,  and  the  means  by  which 
agreement is reached, is the experimental matter of fact. Here, as I 
have  indicated,  matters  of  fact  are not  treated  as the  exclusive 
property of  any one philosophical  sect. Insofar as the alchemists 
have produced  experimental findings,  they  have  minted  the real 
coins of  experimental exchange. Their experiments are welcome, 
while  their  'obscure'  speculations  are  not.  Insofar  as  the 
Aristotelians produce few experiments, and insofar as they refuse 
to  dismantle  the  'arch'-like  'mutual  coherence'  of  their 
philosophical  system into facts and theories, they can make little 
contribution to the experimental ~onference.~~  In these ways, the 
structure  and  the  linguistic  conventions  of  this  imaginary 
conversation make vivid the rules for real conversations proper to 
experimental philosophy. 
Real  disputes followed  hard  upon the imaginary  ones  of  The 
Sceptical Chymist, providing Boyle with valuable opportunities of 
putting  his principles into practice. Linus was the adversary who 
experimented but who denied the power of the 'spring of the air'; 
Henry More was the adversary whom Boyle wished to be an ally -
offering what  he  regarded  as  a  theologically  more  appropriate 
explanation of Boyle's  pneumatic  findings;  and Hobbes was the 
adversary who denied the value of experiment and the foundational 
status of  the matter of  fact. Each carefully crafted response that 
Boyle produced was labelled as a model for how disputes should be 
managed by the experimental philosopher.64 
First,  all  public  disputes had to be justified:  the experimental 
philosopher  should  be  loath to engage in controversy.  As Boyle 
claimed, '. . . I have a natural indisposedness to contention . . .'65 
The justification  was not the defence of  one's reputation but the Shapin: Pump  and Circumstance  505 
protection  of  what was  vital  to the collective practice of  proper 
philosophy: the value of systematic experimentation, the matters of 
fact that experiment produced, the boundaries that separated those 
facts from less certain epistemological items, and the rules of social 
life that regulated discourse in the experimental community. As we 
have seen, Boyle took care to identify the object of controversy  as 
interpretations of facts, not the facts themselves. Neither Linus nor 
Hobbes, he said, denied 'any thing that I deliver as experiment . . ., 
so  that  usually  . . . they  are  fain  to fall  upon  the  hypotheses 
themselves.'  This  was  a  crucial  stipulation, because,  if  it  was 
accepted, then the arena of disagreement could be so defined as to 
protect  the  status of  matters  of  fact. The very  phenomenon  of 
public  disputation about 'hypotheses'  could be contrasted to the 
absence  of  controversy  about  that  which  Boyle  'deliver[ed]  as 
experiment' .66 
The importance of protecting experimental practice is evident in 
the differing tones of  Boyle's  responses to Linus and to Hobbes. 
While Linus attacked the spring of the air, the major interpretative 
resource  of  Boyle's  pneumatics,  'he  takes  no  exceptions  at the 
experiments  themselves,  as  we  have  recorded  them.'  Boyle 
concluded that this 'is no contemptible testimony, that the matters 
of  fact  have  been  rightly  delivered  . . .'  The  Jesuit  was 
congratulated  for  essaying  to  experiment  himself  and  for  his 
diligence in  understanding  what  Boyle  had  written."  He was  a 
good  adversary and was  dealt  with  as a potential convert. With 
Hobbes  the  situation was  quite  different. This  adversary,  'not 
content to fall upon the explications of my experiments, has (by an 
attempt,  for  aught  I  know,  unexampeled)  endeavoured  to 
disparage  unobvious  experiments  themselves,  and  to discourage 
others from making them.'68 Hobbes was a dangerous adversary; 
there was no possibility of recruiting such a man to the experimen- 
tal programme, and his objections had to be publicly exploded. 
For all that, Hobbes, no less than Linus and More, had to be 
dealt  with  civilly. Boyle  aimed, he  said,  'to give  an example of 
disputing  in  print  against  a  provoking,  though  unprovoked, 
adversary, without bitterness and incivility . . .' He hoped that his 
own Exarnen 'will not be thought to have less of reason for having 
the less of passion . . .'69  Managing a dispute with Hobbes was a 
hard case, and, if  it could be conducted in a decent tone, it would 
offer a  model  of  the language of controversy  appropriate to a 
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have far to look to find examples of improper disputation, in which 
the language of controversy acted to exacerbate divisions in natural 
philosophy. From the mid-1650s Hobbes's natural philosophy and 
geometry had been attacked by the Oxford professors John Wallis 
and Seth Ward. Wallis, one of the toughest  street-fighters of the 
new philosophy, had not only shown his adversary's  notions to be 
erroneous, he  had punned  upon  the plebian origins of Hobbes's 
name  and  insinuated  improper  political  affiliations  and 
motivations.  Hobbes,  who  professed  himself  concerned  for 
maintaining good manners in dispute, showed his  foes the sharp 
side of his tongue: 
So go your  ways,  you  Uncivil Ecclesiastics,  Inhuman  Divines,  Dedoctors  of 
moral it.^,  Unasinous Colleagues,  Egregious  pair  of  Issachars,  tnost  wretched 
Vindices and Indices Academiarutn . . .'O 
And again, summing up the value of one of Wallis's  criticisms, 
. . . all error and railing, that is, stinking wind; such as a jade lets fly, when he is 
too hard girt upon a full belly." 
This is what Boyle wished to avoid. It was not merely a matter of 
Boyle's individual 'modest' temperament or what he reckoned was 
owing to fellow Christian philosophers. What was at issue was the 
creation and preservation of a calm public space in which natural 
philosophers could heal their divisions, collectively agree upon the 
foundations of  knowledge,  and, thereby, establish their credit in 
Restoration culture. Such a calm space was vital to achieving these 
goals. As Boyle reminded his readers in the introduction to his New 
Experiments, published  in  that  'wonderful  pacifick  year'  of  the 
Restoration  of  the  monarchy,  'the  strange  confusions  of  this 
unhappy nation, in the midst  of  which  I  have made and written 
these experiments, are apt to disturb that  calmness  of mind  and 
undistractedness of thoughts, that are wont to be requisite to happy 
speculations.'72  And Sprat recalled the circumstances of the Oxford 
group of experimentalists that spawned the Royal Society: 'Their 
first purpose was no more, then onely the satisfaction of breathing 
a freer air, and of  conversing in quiet one with another, without 
being ingag'd in the passions, and madness of that dismal Age.' He 
described  the  difference  between  'humane  affairs',  which  'may 
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study of nature: 'that gives us room to differ, without animosity; 
and permits us to raise contrary imaginations upon it, without any 
danger of a Civil War.'73 
This  calm  space  that  experimental  philosophy  was  to inhabit 
would be created and maintained  through the deployment within 
the  moral  community  of  appropriate  linguistic  practices.'%n 
appropriate language  had to perform  several functions. First,  it 
had to be  a resource for managing dissent and conflict  in such a 
way  as to make it  possible  for philosophers to express  divergent 
views  while  leaving the foundations of knowledge intact, and, in 
fact,  buttressing  these  foundations.  We  have  seen  this  in  the 
linguistic  separation  Boyle  wished  to  make  between  speech  of 
matters of fact and speech of explanatory items. Second, it had to 
facilitate  reconciliation  amongst  existing  sects  of  philosophers, 
mobilizing  that reconciliation so as to reinforce the foundational 
status of matters of fact. We have seen this in Boyle's  distribution 
of  authentic  matters  of  fact  amongst  groups  with  divergent 
theoretical commitments and in his identification of experimental 
matters of  fact  as the medium  of  exchange in the new  practice. 
Third, such a language had to constitute a vehicle whereby matters 
of  fact  could  effectively  be  generated  and  validated  by  a 
community whose  size was,  in  principle, unlimited. And this we 
have  seen  in  the  role  played  by  Boyle's  literary  technology  in 
multiplying the witnessing experience. 
Scientific Knowledge and Exposition: Conclusions 
I  have  shown  that  three  technologies  were  involved  in  the 
production and validation of Boyle's experimental matters of fact: 
the  material,  the  literary  and  the  social.  Although  I  have 
concentrated  here  upon  the  literary  technology,  I  have  also 
suggested that the three technologies are not distinct: the working 
of  each  depends upon and incorporates the others. I  want  now 
briefly  to develop  that  point  by  showing how  each  technology 
contributes to a common strategy for constituting matters of fact. 
What makes a fact different from an artefact is that the former is 
not  perceived  to  be  man-made.  What  men  make,  men  may 
unmake, but  a matter of  fact  is  taken to be  the  very  mirror  of 
nature. To identify the role of human agency in the making of an 
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otherwise. To shift agency on to natural reality is to stipulate the 
grounds for universal assent. Each of the three technologies works 
to achieve the appearance of matters of fact as given  items: each 
functions as an objectifying resource. 
Take, for example, the role of the air-pump in the production of 
matters of  fact. As  I  have noted, pneumatic facts were machine- 
made. The product of the pump was not, as it is for the modern 
scientific  machines  studied  by Latour, an 'inscription':  it  was  a 
visual experience that had to be transformed into an inscription by 
a  witne~s.'~  However,  the  air-pump  of  the  1660s  has  this  in 
common with the gamma counter of the present-day  neuroendo- 
crinological  laboratory:  it  stands  between  the  perceptual 
competences of a human being and natural reality itself. A  'bad' 
observation taken from a machine need not be ascribed to cognitive 
or moral faults in the human being, nor is a 'good' observation his 
personal product. It is the machine that has generated the finding. 
A striking instance of this usage arose in the 1660s when Christiaan 
Huygens offered a matter of  fact produced  by  his  pump which 
appeared  to conflict  with  one  of  Boyle's  central  explanatory 
resources.  Boyle  did  not  impugn  Huygens's  integrity  or  his 
perceptual and cognitive competences. Instead, he suggested  that 
the fault lay with the machine: '[I] question not his Ratiocination, 
but only the staunchness of his pump."6  The machine constitutes a 
resource  that  may  be  used  to  factor  out  human agency  in  the 
intellectual product: 'it is not 1 who says this: it is the machine that 
speaks,' or 'it is not your fault; it is the machine's.' 
Boyle's social technology constituted an objectifying resource by 
making  the  production  of  knowledge  visible  as  a  collective 
enterprise: 'it is not 1who says this; it is all of us.' As Sprat insisted, 
collective performance and collective witness served to correct the 
natural working of the 'idols':  the faultiness, the idiosyncracy or 
the bias of any individual's judgement  and observational ability. 
The Royal Society advertised itself as a 'union of eyes, and hands'; 
the space in  which  it  produced  its  experimental knowledge  was 
stipulated to be a public space.  It was public in a very precisely 
defined and very rigorously policed sense: not everyone could come 
in; not everyone's testimony was of equal worth; not everyone was 
equally  able  to  influence  the  official  voice  of  the  institution. 
Nevertheless,  what  Boyle  was  proposing,  and  what  the  Royal 
Society was endorsing, was a crucially important move towards the 
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on the one hand, with the private work of the alchemists, and, on 
the  other,  with  the  individual  dictates  of  the  systematical 
philosophers. 
In the official formulation of the Royal Society, the production 
of  experimental knowledge commenced  with  individuals'  acts of 
seeing  and  believing,  and  was  completed  when  all  individuals 
voluntarily agreed with one another about what had been seen and 
ought to be believed. This freedom to speak had to be protected by 
a special sort of discipline. Radical individualism -each individual 
setting  himself  up as the ultimate judge  of knowledge - would 
destroy the conventional basis of knowledge, while the disciplined 
collective social structure of the experimental language game would 
create and sustain that  factual basis.  Thus, the experimentalists 
were on guard against  'dogmatists'  and 'tyrants'  in philosophy, 
just as they abominated 'secretists' who produced their knowledge- 
claims in a private space. No one man was to have the right to lay 
down what was to count as knowledge. Legitimate knowledge was 
objective insofar as it was produced by the collective, and agreed to 
voluntarily  by  those  who  comprised  the  collective.  The 
objectification  of  knowledge proceeded  through  displays  of  the 
communal basis  of  generation  and evaluation.  Human coercion 
was to have no visible place in the experimental way of life.77 
It  was  the  function  of  the literary  technology  to create  that 
communal way of life, to bound it, and to provide the forms and 
conventions of social relations within it. The literary technology of 
virtual witnessing supplemented the public space of the laboratory 
by extending a valid witnessing experience to all readers of the text. 
The boundaries stipulated by Boyle's  linguistic practices acted to 
keep that community from fragmenting and served to protect items 
of knowledge to which  one could  expect  universal  assent  from 
items which produced divisiveness.  Similarly, Boyle's  stipulations 
concerning proper manners in dispute worked to guarantee that 
social solidarity which generated assent to matters of fact and to 
rule out of order those imputations which would  undermine the 
moral integrity of the experimental way of life. 
I  have  attempted  to display  these  linguistic  practices  in  the 
making, and, within restrictions of space, I have alluded to sources 
of seventeenth-century opposition to  these practices. It is important 
to understand two things about these ways of expounding scientific 
knowledge  and  securing  assent:  that  they  are  historical 
constructions and that there have been alternative practices. It is Social Studies of Science 
particularly important to understand this because of the problems 
of givenness and self-evidence that attend the institutionalization 
and  conventionalization  of  these  practices.  Just  as  the  three 
technologies operate to create the illusion that matters of fact are 
not man-made, so the institutionalized and conventional status of 
the scientific discourse that Boyle  helped  to produce  makes  the 
illusion  that  scientists'  speech  about  natural  reality  is  simply  a 
reflection of that reality. In this instance, and in others like it, the 
historian has two major tasks: to display the man-made nature of 
scientific  knowledge,  and  to  account  for  the  illusion  that  this 
knowledge is not man-made. It is one of the recommendations of 
the sociology of knowledge perspective that analysts often attempt 
to accomplish these two tasks in the same exerci~e.'~ 
In the late twentieth century scientific papers are rarely, if  ever, 
written  with  the  depth  of  circumstantial  detail  which  Boyle's 
reports contained. Why might this be? The answer to this question 
leads  us  to  the  study  of  linguistic  aspects  of  scientific 
institutionalization  and  differentiation.  In  discussing  the 
characteristics of a Denkkollektiv, Ludwik Fleck noted that such a 
group  cultivates  'a  certain  exclusiveness  both  formally  and  in 
content': 
A  thought  commune  becomes  isolated  formally,  but  also  absolutely bonded 
together, through statutory and customary arrangements, sometimes a separate 
language, or at least special terminology . . . The optimum system of  a science, 
the ultimate organization of its principles, is completely incomprehensible to the 
novice [or, Fleck might have added, to any non-member].-' 
Fleck  was suggesting that the linguistic conventions of  a body of 
practitioners  constitute  an  answer  to  the  question  'Who  may 
speak?'  The  language  of  an  institutionalized  and  specialized 
scientific  group is  removed  from ordinary speech,  and from the 
speech of scientists belonging to another community, both as a sign 
and as a vehicle of the group's  special and bounded  status. Not 
everyone may speak; the ability to speak entails the mastering of 
special linguistic  competences; and the use of ordinary speech is 
taken as a sign of non-membership and non-competence. Such a 
group gives linguistic indications that the generation and validation 
of its knowledge does not require the mobilizing of belief, trust and 
assent  outwith  its  own  social  boundaries.  (Yet,  when  external 
support or subvention  is  required,  special  occasional  modes  of 
speech  may  be  resorted  to,  including  the  various  languages  of 
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By  contrast, Boyle's  circumstantial  reporting  was  a  means of 
involving a wider community and soliciting its participation in the 
making  of  factual  experimental  knowledge.  His  circumstantial 
language was a way of bringing readers into the experimental scene, 
indeed of making the reader an actor in that scene. The reader was 
to be shown not just the products of experiments but their mode of 
construction and the contingencies affecting their performance, as 
ifhe  werepresent. Boyle aimed to accomplish this, not by inventing 
a  totally  novel  language  (although it  was  novel  to the  natural 
philosophical community of the time), but, it could be argued, by 
incorporating  aspects  of  ordinary  speech  and lay  techniques  of 
validating  knowledge-claims. The language  of  early Restoration 
experimental science was, in this sense, a public language. And the 
use of  this public language was, in Boyle's  work, essential to the 
creation of both the knowledge  and the  social  solidarity of  the 
experimental community. Trust and assent had to be won from a 
public that might crucially deny trust and assent. 
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